Originally identified by Hume, the validity of is-ought inference is much debated in the meta-ethics literature. Our work shows that inference from is to ought typically proceeds from contextualised, value-laden causal utility conditional, bridging into a deontic conclusion. Such conditional statements tell us what actions are needed to achieve or avoid consequences that are good or bad. Psychological research has established that people generally reason fluently and easily with utility conditionals. Our own research also has shown that people's reasoning from is to ought (deontic introduction) is pragmatically sensitive and adapted to achieving the individual's goals. But how do we acquire the necessary deontic rules? In this paper, we provide a rationale for this facility linked to Evans's (Thinking twice: two minds in one brain, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2010) framework of dual mind rationality. People have an old mind (in evolutionary terms) which derives its rationality by repeating what has worked in the past, mostly by experiential learning. New mind rationality, in contrast, is evolutionarily recent, uniquely developed in humans, and draws on our ability to mentally simulate hypothetical events removed in time and place. We contend that the new mind achieves its goals by inducing and applying deontic rules and that a mechanism of deontic introduction evolved for this purpose.
Readership of this special issue will readily identify this inference for what it is-a case of the notorious inference from is to ought. First identified by Hume (2000 Hume ( , pp. 1739 Hume ( -1740 , is-ought inference (a.k.a, less kindly, 'the is-ought fallacy' or 'the is-ought problem') means that we infer from descriptive premises to normative conclusions-or, in logical terms, from indicative premises to modal, deontic conclusions. Before we go any further, it is well-worth citing the original paragraph from Hume in his own words:
In every system of morality, which I have hitherto met with, I have always remarked, that the author proceeds for some time in the ordinary way of reasoning, and establishes the being of a God, or makes observations concerning human affairs; when of a sudden I am surprized to find, that instead of the usual copulations of propositions, is, and is not, I meet with no proposition that is not connected with an ought, or an ought not. This change is imperceptible; but is, however, of the last consequence. For as this ought, or ought not, expresses some new relation or affirmation, it is necessary that it should be observed and explained; and at the same time that a reason should be given, for what seems altogether inconceivable, how this new relation can be a deduction from others, which are entirely different from it. But as authors do not commonly use this precaution, I shall presume to recommend it to the readers; and am persuaded, that this small attention would subvert all the vulgar systems of morality, and let us see, that the distinction of vice and virtue is not founded merely on the relations of objects, nor is perceived by reason.
You might have noticed that Hume actually makes two moves here. Like a good scientist, he starts with an observation: people suddenly revert from 'is' and 'isnot', to 'ought' and 'ought-not', without an explanation how these are linked. His second move is then normative: to point out the logical gap between 'is' and 'ought'. Philosophers tend to focus on the latter, and rivers of ink have been spilt over the question of inference from is to ought is deductively valid, and if it is, under which circumstances (see Hudson 1969; Pigden 2010 , for reviews). Gerhard Schurz has been one of the leading contributors to this debate, with an influential volume presenting a complete modal and deontic analysis of the is-ought problem (Schurz 1997) . As psychologists, however, we would like to point out that the normative question is only of interest if the observation stands up to scrutiny. Thus, we ask in this chapter:
1. How keen was Hume's psychological observation? Do humans actually make inferences from is to ought? 2. Supposing the answer to question (1) is 'Yes', what are the psychological mechanisms that underlie this inference? Under which circumstances do we make is-ought inference? 3. Lastly and importantly, why do people draw is-ought inference? Does it have an evolutionary function, and if so, what might it be?
All these questions have bearings on Gerhard Schurz's work-the first two questions due to his contribution to the philosophical debate over the is-ought question, and the third one due to his interest in evolution (Schurz 2011a, b) and cognitive success (Schurz 2014) . In what follows, we tackle these questions in the order in which they are presented.
1 How do we reason from is to ought?
Deontic logic and human inference: some background
We regard is-ought inference in everyday life as deontic introduction-the means by which people infer deontic rules from observations. This form of reasoning was neglected by psychologists until very recently. However, we have known for some time that people are adept at reasoning with deontic rules, if they are presented to them. The discovery of this by psychologists was somewhat serendipitous, arising from research on an entirely different question, namely the claim that people reason more logically when problem content is thematic rather than abstract (Wason and Johnson-Laird 1972) . This claim of a so-called thematic facilitation effect arose from the invention of a simple looking but ferociously difficult reasoning problem known as the Wason selection task (Wason 1966) . In the standard, indicative version of this task, participants are presented with a conditional rule (e.g., 'If there is an A on one side then there is an 8 on the other side'). They are also presented with four cards, each of which has a letter on one side and a number on the other side. Only one side of the card is exposed (e.g., A, K, 8, 5). They are told that the rule applies to the cards and may be true or false. Their task is to select the cards-and only the cards-that can show if the rule is true and false. From a classical logic point of view, 1 the normatively correct solution is to turn over the p card (true antecedent) and the not-q card (false consequent; A and 5, in this case, respectively) as a conditional statement 'if p then q' can only be false if we have p without q. In this standard form, the task is notoriously difficult (see Evans and Over 2004 , for a review): only about 10% of adult participants make this normative choice (Stanovich 1999) , an effect replicated many times in the literature that was to follow. Wason and Johnson-Laird had claimed that the problem could be made a lot easier if thematic or familiar problem content was used. An early paper which supported this position employed a drinking age rule (Griggs and Cox 1983) . Participants are instructed to imagine that they were police officers responsible to enforce a rule in a bar: 'If a person is drinking beer, then the person must be over 19 years of age' (the legal drinking age in some states of the USA at the time of the study). Instead of asking to identify the cards that will test the veracity of the rule, participants were instructed to turn over the cards to determine whether or not people were violating the rule. Choices of the p and not-q, normatively correct solution soared, again replicated many times since. Research on this problem and many similar ones (see Over et al. 1994) provided strong apparent support for the thematic facilitation effect and much was made of the domain-specificity of the versions of the task that were easy to solve (Cosmides 1989) .
It transpired that the claim that versions of the selection tasks such as the drinkingage problem showed a thematic facilitation effect was seriously flawed (Cheng and Holyoak 1985; Manktelow and Over 1991) . While the standard abstract task is a test of indicative logic-discovering whether the conditional statement is true or false-the drinking age problem is a task in deontic logic concerned with discovering whether or not a rule has been obeyed. So the apparent comparison between abstract and thematic forms of the problem was not comparing like with like from a logical viewpoint. While there were many published reports of the selection task being easy to solve with thematic materials, the great bulk of these studies used deontic conditionals that expressed permissions or obligations. From our point of view, the important lesson is that while people are weak in reasoning about truth and falsity they are strong in reasoning about deontic relationships-what they should and should not do. Content which is merely familiar but lacking such deontic relationships is much less helpful. It has been suggested that the facility for deontic reasoning has an evolutionary basis (Cosmides 1989 ) but one could equally argue that it reflects a form of pragmatic reasoning linked to language and learning (Cheng and Holyoak 1985) . Another approach is decision-theoretic, with the claim that when the Wason selection task is viewed as a decision-making problem, card choices reflect the utilities which people expect to receive by their selections (Manktelow and Over 1991; Oaksford and Chater 1994) .
More recently, research on deontic conditionals has been extended to other methods than the selection task (see Evans and Over 2004 , for a review). There is actually a wide range of different types of utility conditionals (Bonnefon 2009) , that is, conditional statements with utility attached either to the antecedent, the consequent, or both. Such utilities influence, for example, our perception of whether conditional advice is useful or not (Evans et al. 2008 ) and the effectiveness of conditional arguments for persuasion and dissuasion (Thompson et al. 2005) . The general pattern, found across many studies, is that the efficacy of such conditionals is sensitive to the costs and benefits associated with actions and their outcomes, as well as the conditional probability of the outcome given the action, and more specifically the causal link between action and outcome.
It is clear from this previous work that unlike indicative logical reasoning, which people find hard, deontic reasoning is natural to participants in laboratory studies, who make such inferences with little effort and are responsive to small nuances in the contexts used. That we observe such reasoning in the laboratory indicates to us that it plays a major role in real world thinking and reasoning. This then poses the question as to how people acquire the deontic rules that serve them well in the everyday world, which we will address shortly.
Inference from is to ought and the rationality debate
It is not just lab participants who are attracted to deontic reasoning and find deontic inference easy to draw. Inference from is to ought features prominently within the rationality debate, as we identified in our critique of what we dubbed 'normativism' Evans and Elqayam 2011) . Normativism is an ought position: the idea that human rationality is best measured against some sort of normative standard-be it classical logic, the probability calculus, or quantum probability. Moreover, this is a clearly evaluative ought, with major contributor to the debate unabashedly referring to 'good' and 'bad' reasoning (e.g., Oaksford and Chater 2007, p. 25) .
The normativist stance quickly became entangled with a closely related debate: of several potentially relevant normative systems, which was the most appropriate against which to gauge human rationality? It is easy to see why this is such an all-important issue. Take the Wason selection task: if classical logic is how participants ought to perform, the unavoidable conclusion is that the vast majority of intelligent adults perform abysmally. But with Bayesian information gain as the normative system, the modal response patterns become nicely rational, as Oaksford and Chater (1994) were quick to point out. But how can people be rational and irrational at the same time? Thus rose the problem of arbitration: the need to decide which of two (often more) conflicting normative ought standards were appropriate for any particular research paradigm. 2 Psychologists are trained to solve problems with experiments. You need to arbitrate between theory A and theory B? Why then, you run a critical experiment and use the results to decide which theory is the right one. Faced with two competing oughts, theorists resorted to the same method-run a study, use the results to arbitrate. Descriptive, is evidence, used to support normative, ought theory-an is-ought inference if there ever was one. Rather confusingly, psychologists drew is-ought inference to argue that people ought to reason the way that they actually do reason (Oaksford and Chater 2007) , but also, on the other side of the debate, to argue just the opposite: that people ought to reason the way most of them did not reason (except for the smartest ones; Stanovich 1999) . Both sides were drawing is-ought inference, but using different is premises (modal responses vs. responses of elite reasoners, respectively) to draw different ought conclusions. This is an important lesson in the relativity of is-ought inference. Be that as it may, one thing was apparent: that even reasoning experts were not immune to drawing is-ought inference. Because a normatively dubious inference was used to support the normativist stance, we called this 'the normativist paradox'.
A theory of deontic introduction
The normativist paradox presented an inconsistency too puzzling for us (as psychologists) to ignore. It seemed that is-ought inference was irresistibly compelling, even for top scientists. From there the road was short to developing a theory of is-ought inference (Elqayam et al. 2015) . We called it deontic introduction, because it introduces deontic operators in the conclusion although there are none in the premises. Our starting point was the postulate that deontic introduction is a common type of informal inference. We adopted a broadly decision-theoretic approach, inspired by previous psychological work which successfully analysed informal arguments within a Bayesian framework (Corner et al. 2011; Hahn and Oaksford 2007) , and by previ-ous work on utility conditionals (Bonnefon 2009 ). 3 Such conditionals are a paradigm case of what has been dubbed 'bridge constructs' (Schurz 1997) , that is, constructs that mix both descriptive and evaluative elements. A boss threatening an employee 'If you turn up late again, I will fire you', links an outcome with negative utility (being fired) to an action that leads to it (which also bears negative utility, for the boss). It is descriptive and evaluative at the same time: descriptive because it describes a causal relationship between action and outcome; evaluative because both action and outcome are value-laden. Recall that costs and benefits as well as conditional probability play a significant role in the effectiveness of utility conditionals (Evans et al. 2008; Thompson et al. 2005 ). In our interpretation, costs and benefits are evaluative while probability is descriptive, producing a clear bridge construct.
Consider the example we started with. Tom is cooking a special Italian dinner to celebrate his wedding anniversary. If Tom cooks with a brand of olive oil produced in the small Italian town of Fontignani, his dinner will taste better. Does it then follow that Tom ought to cook with the Fontignani olive oil? This is an example of the experimental paradigm we developed to study deontic introduction (Elqayam et al. 2015) . The materials always included a vignette to provide context-we know from work on the Wason selection task that deontic tasks need at least minimal context (Evans and Over 2004 )-followed by a utility conditional of the form 'If action then outcome', with utility associated with the outcome. Participants were then invited to evaluate a range of deontic conclusions, such as 'Tom must [must-not/should/should-not/may/neednot] cook with the Fontignani olive oil', on a Likert-type scale measuring inference strength (which we deemed more appropriate for informal inference than a dichotomous measure of validity).
According to the theory of deontic introduction, there is a mostly-implicit and enthymematic chain of inference leading from such contextualised bridge premises to deontic conclusions, represented in Fig. 1 . It starts with two interpretive inferences, causal inference, which interprets the causal structure of the premise ('using the Fontignani olive oil will cause the dish to taste better'), and goal inference, which interprets the utility of the outcome relative to the goal specified in the vignette ('better taste is good'). The value then transfers from the outcome to the action itself, an inference we dubbed value transference ('using the Fontignani olive oil is good'). Up to this stage we are within the realm of descriptive premises-albeit 'bridge'-type premises, rich with evaluative, utility-laden contents. The final inference is the actual deontic bridging from value to deontic operators, concluding that Tom should use the Fontgnani olive oil. The upshot of this is that the valence of the deontic operator matches the valence of the outcome-positive to positive, negative to negative-which is indeed what we found to be the case.
Informal inference is typically defeasible (Oaksford and Chater 2007) , that is, additional information can suppress the conclusion from being drawn. The same is true for deontic inference (e.g., Nute 1997), 4 (2015) was no exception. We drew on this useful feature when constructing our experimental paradigm, by systematically introducing suppressions to test each link of the implicit inference chain. For example, when participants were presented with causal defeaters such as 'The Fontginani olive oil is past its best-buy date' (providing a disabler, or a reason why the action is not sufficient for the outcome), the strength of the inference was rated significantly lower, thus supporting the hypothesised necessity of a causal link from action to outcome. We tested the role of utility by introducing suppressions that undermined the value of the outcome, for example 'If Tom uses Fontignani olive oil, he will have an allergic reaction', thereby inviting the opposite inference, namely, that using the Fontignani olive oil is bad, and suppressing value transference. Lastly, we suppressed deontic bridging itself by introducing conflicting norms, as a direct suppression of the deontic rule. For example, if we state that Fontignani olive oil is produced by intensive farming that harms the environment, this invites the inference that Tom should not use it, thus suppressing the conclusion that he should. All these manipulations had the effect of suppressing deontic introduction. Finally, in a separate study , we established the link between deontic introduction and moral judgement. Specifically, we showed that deontic introduction is the cognitive mechanism that underlies utilitarian but not deontological moral judgement-that is, moral judgement based on the consequences of one's actions rather than on absolute moral edicts, respectively. Task analysis shows that deontic introduction is unnecessary for deontological moral judgement, since a relevant deontic rule is primed a priori. In contrast, utilitarian moral judgement requires deontic introduction to bridge from the value of the consequences of one's action to the deontic 'ought' rule. Since the turn of the millennium, psychological research into moral judgement has flourished (e.g., Greene et al. 2001) , but the vast majority of empirical work focused on the infamous 'trolley problems', (Thomson 1985) , in which the decision is between sacrificing the few to save the many (utilitarian judgement), or avoiding taking action altogether (deontological judgement). The forced-choice nature of this paradigm makes it unsuitable to disentangle utilitarian from deontological judgement, and so we had to develop our own non-trolley paradigm.
We gave participants vignettes in which an agent could take a utilitarian action versus a deontological action. For example, one of the vignettes described an anthropologist working with a tribe whose religious beliefs severely limited their fruit and vegetable intake, leading to prevalence of scurvy. The utilitarian action in this case was trying to get the tribe people to eat more fruit and vegetables, whereas the deontological action was respecting their beliefs. Participants were given a typical deontic introduction task for both the utilitarian and the deontological conclusion, that is, they were asked to evaluate inference strength for conclusions such as 'Ben must get the tribe members to eat more fruit and vegetables' (utilitarian), and 'Ben must respect the religious beliefs of the tribe members' (deontological). In two further separate tasks, they also rated directly how morally right or wrong it was for the agent to take the utilitarian action, and to take the deontological action. We used similar defeasibility manipulation as in Elqayam et al. (2015) , and found out that defeasibility was selective: it suppressed utilitarian moral judgement as well as deontic introduction, but it had no significant effect on deontological moral judgement. Thus, deontic introduction selectively coheres with utilitarian, but not deontological, moral judgement.
More than three centuries ago, David Hume first identified is-to-ought inference as a prevalent human behaviour that posed major philosophical difficulties. The ensuing meta-ethical debate has reverberated down the ages, and has never stopped being relevant; however, it mostly focused on whether this inference is normatively valid. In psychology of reasoning, the drive to develop a descriptive theory to account for the psychological processes underlying such inference has been triggered by two related although separate lines of enquiry. Within the rationality debate, top theorists appeared to be drawing is-ought inferences, leading to the observation that no-one is immune; and research into deontic thinking, and more generally into utility conditionals, highlighted the role of utility and probability, thus combining into a bridge construct. Our own work has served to identify the antecedents and boundaries of deontic introduction. We characterised it as an enthymematic, implicit and defeasible chain of informal inference leading from contextualised utility conditionals to deontic conclusions. This inference critically depends on a causal link leading from action to outcome and on the utility of the outcome: it is suppressed when causality or utility are impaired in any way. Deontic introduction is linked to utilitarian moral judgement but not to the deontological type. Thus, we have now addressed our research questions (1) and (2): people indeed draw is-ought inference and in this sense Hume's psychological insight was (as it so often is) well-founded; and we know a lot more now on how they do so. It is now time to address research question (3): why?
2 Why do we reason from is to ought?
We have presented our evidence that people frequently introduce deontic rules by is-ought inference, as well as our theory of how they do so. Now we turn to the question of why they do so. First, we note that deontic introduction seems to be a species-specific generative capacity. It enables us to generate novel, tailor-made, contextualised deontic rules, in much the same way that human language capacity allows us to generate novel sentences within novel contexts. 5 Carruthers (2006) has already noted that, although non-human animals sometimes seem to obey normative rules, they do not internalise them. This is consistent with our claim that only humans generate novel norms.
We believe that deontic introduction confers a clear evolutionary advantage to the human race, in much the same way that language does. However, to explain how this works in context we first need to introduce the broader theoretical framework of two minds theory. This is the idea that there are two distinct minds (sometimes referred to as systems) within the human brain. One of these is old in evolutionary terms, and shares forms of cognition with non-humans animals, most importantly various kinds of experiential learning. We humans also have a new mind which is distinctively developed in our species and makes us different in important ways from other animals. A number of different authors have proposed variants of this idea (for example , Epstein 1994; Mithen 1996; Reber 1993; Stanovich 2004 ) but we draw here mostly on the two minds theory of Evans (2010) which makes specific proposals about two forms of knowledge and decision making that arise in the two minds.
Let us start with consideration of different memory systems. There are clear evolutionary arguments for the existence of multiple memory systems in the brain (Carruthers 2006; Sherry and Schacter 1987) . For example, associative learning, which has been much studied in animals from the time of the behaviourists, allows associations to be formed gradually, with different degrees of strength from repeated experiences. This has clear adaptive advantages as an animal may learn, for example, that favoured food sources are cued by the presence of certain landscape features. But if this was the only kind of memory available, it could also let the animal down badly. For example, a rich source of food may have been encountered in an atypical location, or a particular place cued by the associations is discovered to be home to a dangerous predator. Hence, a different type of episodic memory, allowing the animal to encode individual events as opposed to general associations is also needed. This must be something separate, working on different principles. Within the human brain, much recent research using neuroscientific methods has established the independent location and function of a number of quite distinct forms of memory (Eichenbaum and Cohen 2001) .
We do not favour the view which was at one time popular (Evans 2003) that there is a 'System 1' which humans share with animals and a 'System 2' which is unique to humans. Controlled attention, working memory and episodic memory are all, for example, features of animal cognition (Toates 2006) as well as the new mind of humans. However, we do believe that the new mind is uniquely developed in humans from its rudiments in the animal world. At its core is a singular and flexible working memory system of the kind studied by Alan Baddeley and his colleagues (Baddeley 2007) . This allows explicit processing of information in a flexible manner and is vital to novel problem solving and decision making. It corresponds with what is known as Type 2 (effortful) processing in dual-process theories of higher cognition (Evans and Stanovich 2013) . However, a key argument in the Evans (2010) account is that the new mind does not consist solely or even mostly of Type 2 processing (a strong reason to avoid the term System 2). The contents of working memory, or if you prefer those of conscious thinking, are derived from a host of sources in the brain by wholly automatic and unconscious Type 1 processing. Such automated processes are responsible for perception, language processing and retrieval of information from different forms of memory, for example. But the new mind, unlike the old, operates through thinking and reasoning about explicit content which passes through working memory.
The new mind did not, however, replace the old, but rather co-exists with it. While the two minds generally cooperate, they can also conflict (Evans 2010; Stanovich 2004) . The old mind of humans is indeed similar in many respects to those of other animals. It provides, for example, basic emotions and motivations such as hunger, fear and lust. It also has an implicit form of experiential learning at its core. The behaviourists were right to claim that humans have a form of associative learning very similar to that of other animals. Their mistake was to assume that this was all that was needed to account for human behaviour, effectively denying and ignoring the new mind. Modern cognitive psychologists, in turn, should avoid the mistake of thinking that implicit knowledge is simply that which has been automated from explicit learning. In fact, there is abundant evidence that people may acquire knowledge from implicit learning which never becomes conscious (Berry and Dienes 1993; Cleeremans 2015; Reber 1993) . It can also be argued that when explicit knowledge becomes automated, this does not occur by any internal transfer of information in the brain. Rather, when behaviour is repeated by conscious application of rules, this provides the necessary inputs and outputs for the implicit learning systems. In effect, the new mind trains the old (Evans 2010) . How else could verbal instruction be useful in teaching someone how to drive a car or play the piano? These skills, once acquired, are deep forms of implicit knowledge. What instruction-and self-instruction-does is to make us repeatedly practice the behaviours that will lead to this implicit learning.
The two minds theory is consistent with what neuroscience tells us about the brain. For example, we know that there are multiple learning and memory systems with distinct neural locations (Eichenbaum and Cohen 2001) . Implicit and associative forms of learning, attributed to the old mind, are indeed in evolutionarily old parts of the brains such as the basal ganglia and amygdala and shared with many other animals. We also know that during the period when archaeological evidence of the emergence of new mind in modern humans can be found (Mithen 1996) , there was a rapid and unexplained increase in the size of the frontal lobes of the human brain. This brain region, which is disproportionately developed in humans, is strongly associated with working memory and executive function (Baddeley 2007) which in turn are central to the kind of flexible thought attributed to the new mind. For further discussion see Evans (2010) .
In essence, the two minds theory asserts that there are two distinct cognitive systems underlying human behaviour of different evolutionary origins. The old mind is responsible for the acquisition of habits: behaviours which respond to familiar patterns and require little conscious thought and effort. The new mind provides forms of cognition uniquely developed in humans allowing us to solve novel problems by reasoning, and to make decisions by simulating their consequences in thought exper-iments representing events removed in space and time. The particular version of two minds theory proposed by Evans (2010) also asserts that there are separate systems of learning, memory and knowledge underlying these two forms of cognition. Our theory of the origin of is-ought inference is directly linked with this framework as we will demonstrate shortly.
Two minds rationality
Philosophers commonly distinguish between instrumental and epistemic rationality. Instrumental rationality means acting in such a way as to achieve one's goals. This is a shared objective of humans and other animals and the old mind has the means to provide it. The rationality of the old mind is produced by repeating what has worked in the past. Thus, conditioning and associative forms of learning basically repeat successes in the lifetime of the individual. In non-human animals, these are often supplemented by instincts, which are fixed patterns of behaviour that are innately present and triggered by specialised cues. Instincts often serve the individual animals well but are really an expression of the goals of their genes. Some authors refer to this as genetic rationality (Stanovich 2004) . Little (if any) human behaviour meets the biological criteria for instincts, as we do few things in a fixed and invariable manner. It is likely that that reliance on instincts was displaced by the new form of cognition that evolved in humans, allowing us to reason out solutions to novel problems. However, we retain and rely heavily on implicit learning and knowledge. Among other things, we need to link implicit knowledge to action. This is where procedural knowledge, the 'knowing how' (Ryle 1949) of implicit knowledge comes into its own. Such knowledge as how to bake a cake, ride a bike or make a donation to charity is the recipe book of action-and without action there is no instrumental rationality. If epistemic rationality only refers to truth and falsity, procedural knowledge remains unaccounted-for.
Epistemic rationality is traditionally defined by philosophers as the acquisition and maintenance of true beliefs. Deductive reasoning is also seen as a form of epistemic rationality as logical deduction is truth-preserving. In a logically valid deductive argument, the conclusion is always true if its premises are true. This is the philosophical origin of the traditional method of studying human reasoning by giving people logical problems to solve (Evans 2002) . Although it could be argued that higher animals have a form of epistemic rationality in their knowledge for specific events (Sherry and Schacter 1987) , humans also have huge amounts of general knowledge stored in their semantic memories, much of it acquired from reading or education, as well as that inferred from direct experience. Reasoning to action frequently requires us to access such knowledge as may be relevant to the current context. In evolutionary terms, epistemic rationality is subservient to instrumental rationality: we need accurate knowledge in order to achieve our goals. Arguably however, our knowledge needs only be fit for purpose, and psychologists do not need to worry about the slippery concept of truth. We will take this up again in the next section. It is also much more useful to consider epistemic rationality in the human context of new mind cognition, where explicit knowledge plays a major role in reasoning, problem solving and decision making.
While old mind rationality is driven by the past, new mind rationality addresses the future . The key feature of the new mind is hypothetical thinking, or what Stanovich (2011) calls 'cognitive decoupling'. By use of explicit representations in working memory, we can simulate the future so that in principle, at least, we can make decisions by imagining and evaluating their future consequences, just as decision theory dictates. The evidence suggests, however, that we are not all that good at making our decisions this way. There is abundant evidence of non-consequential decision making (Baron 1994) and multiple failures to reason logically or give normatively correct answers to decision and judgement tasks, as well as host of cognitive biases (Evans 2007; Gilovich et al. 2002; Stanovich 2011) . Due to the novelty of most laboratory tasks, new mind intervention is typically required to solve them according to the instructions. The reasons that people do not solve such tasks can be any of the following: they lack the 'mindware' or explicit knowledge of the normative rules; they lack the cognitive capacity to calculate the answer or they rely on unhelpful intuitions so that they do not apply new mind resources to the problems (Stanovich 2011) . In support of these claims, laboratory studies have shown that two individual difference factors are strongly related to solution rates. The first is cognitive ability, which may be measured by several correlates, including IQ and working memory capacity, the second is rational thinking dispositions (Stanovich 1999 (Stanovich , 2011 Stanovich et al. 2016) . The latter measure a disposition to think analytically and not simply rely on intuitions.
As individuals, our typical powers of hypothetical thinking studied in the psychologist's laboratory do not seem very impressive. It has been suggested that such experiments are artificial and unrepresentative of real life situations (Cohen 1981) although this argument is difficult to sustain in view of the large number of studies now accrued that have demonstrated cognitive biases in expert groups and real world contexts (see, for example, Gilovich et al. 2002) . From an evolutionary viewpoint, however, it can be asserted that as a socially organized species we do not need all individuals to be equally adept at novel and difficult reasoning. Indeed, if it were optimal in evolution for all humans to have these abilities in equal measure, then why do we not all have an IQ of 150? It seems evident that great human advances in philosophy, mathematics, science and technology, as well as prolific achievement in arts, have been achieved by relatively few people with exceptional talents. Of particular relevance to the argument here is that such achievements could not have been created by any kind of habit learning. Nor could they have evolved by natural selection, at least not at anything remotely close the actual speed of development. Even in such cases, however, progress would be minimal if each new generation started with a clean slate. Education is a fundamental platform for human cognition so that each new generation of thinkers starts from what the last achieved.
Instrumental rationality and deontic introduction
Marketed in the UK, Nurofen Express Period Pain, in the pink package, presumably targets period pains in particular; for joint and back pains there is a separate product, Nurofen Joint and Back Pain relief in the black package. Both contain exactly the same product: 16 soft capsules containing 200 mg Ibuprofen each. 6 In Australia, a court ruling from 2015 ordered Nurofen manufacturer Reckitt Benckiser to remove packaging claiming targeted pain relief from the shelves (although no such ruling has been made in the UK), arguing that they were misleading as they contained the same active ingredient. However, people do seem to extract considerable value from what they believe about the effects of medical treatment, even when these beliefs are patently unfounded-an effect generally known as placebo (Price et al. 2008) . In other words, placebo is a beneficial false belief . Because they are both false and beneficial, placebo effects can be thought of as the single greatest caveat against the position that sees true beliefs as the bedrock of both epistemic and instrumental rationality. Schurz (2011a Schurz ( , b, 2014 , who generally advocates this position, flags placebo as the "big exception to the all-purpose instrumentality of true beliefs" (2014), but argues that rejecting the benefits of placebo is the price we have to pay for an otherwise consistent scientific worldview, which is more beneficial in the long run.
We submit that placebo effects are not the only fly in the ointment of the truth-based view of instrumental rationality. No less important is the role of deontic introduction, the invalid, non-truth-preserving inference from is to ought. As Schurz demonstrated in a landmark text (1997), Hume's insight stands firm when subjected to the tools of modern modal and deontic logic. No (relevant) normative conclusion can validly be inferred from purely descriptive premises-although it can be inferred from 'bridge' premises which analytically contain both normative and descriptive elements. Deontic introduction as by drawn our participants is indeed inferred from bridge premises (to wit, utility conditionals) and hence might be arguably valid. However, they are not analytically so, and moreover the very concept of truth does not seem to apply to norms in the first place: a norm is applicable or not, instrumentally useful or not, but not true or false. There is no truth to preserve. Yet without norms, what is there to link belief and action? Procedural knowledge is about successful action, not about successful knowledge. Schurz (2014) acknowledges something similar when he argues that neither deductive logic nor the probability calculus, on their own, can provide the basis for cognitive success: successful inductive reasoning is necessary to fill in the gap. Induction is indeed a key facility-without it we can learn nothing. But of course, unlike deductive inferences, induction can never lead to conclusions that are certainly true.
Deontic introduction, like inductive inference, goes beyond the information given. Both facilities provide a strong challenge to the idea of epistemic rationality based upon truth and logic. Induction reasons from observations to probable knowledge and deontic introduction to rules for action. Neither is logically valid and both are essential to our continuing existence. One paradigm case that demonstrates the importance of deontic introduction is in the development of instrumental rationality tools-what Baron (2008) calls prescriptive models. Unlike normative models of rationality, prescriptive models take into account human cognitive architecture and cognitive processes. The most well-known example of a successful prescriptive model is the Nudge theory developed by Nobel Prize laureate Richard Thaler (Thaler and Sunstein 2008) , which makes use of small changes in the decision architecture (the eponymous 'nudges') to affect far-reaching behavioural changes. For example, in countries where there is an opt-out (rather than opt-in) system for organ donation this behaviour is far more prevalent. Recently, our own descriptive theory of deontic introduction (Elqayam et al. 2015) provided the basis for a prescriptive model for rational decision making in clinical medicine (Djulbegovic and Elqayam 2017) . Clearly, prescriptive models need to be inferred from is to ought, since their efficacy depends on empirical descriptive knowledge about human decision making and cognitive architecture.
The origin and function of is-ought inference
With the theoretical background now established we can return to the question of why people so readily and effortlessly draw inferences from is to ought. We should note that the psychology of thinking, reasoning and decision-making is in many ways unrepresentative and misleading, which is why people are often made to look dumb in the laboratory. In writing a recent introductory overview of these fields , the first author was struck by how experiment after experiment requires people to solve novel problems, to which they cannot bring directly relevant experience. Such problems are very demanding of cognitive resources and susceptible to errors and biases. But in real life, we do not deal with novel problems all that much, not all novel problems are so tricky, and we have much opportunity to learn from and apply our previous experience.
In order to achieve our goals we can rely to an extent on the implicit habit forming mechanisms of the old mind. However, if that is all we did, we would not have the distinctively human form of intelligence that we quite evidently enjoy. It is also clear that our education and much of our knowledge are acquired from the internet, news sources and so on. In fact, much if not most of what we know and believe about the world is not based on direct personal experience. This kind of explicit knowledge guides much of our behaviour from decisions about our future education or career to our choice of which motor car to buy or how we vote in a democratic election. The extent to which such beliefs and the inferences we draw from them serve our goals, is a measure of the epistemic rationality provided by the new mind.
Formal education, television news and the internet are, of course, such recent phenomena as to have played no part in our evolution. They can only have their effect because of the system of explicit knowledge and reasoning that had already evolved and could be adapted to these new sources of information. In the absence of formal education (other than verbally transmitted cultural knowledge, social learning, and so on), how could our ancestors have employed the powers of their new minds to achieve their goals? We contend that is-ought inference must have been a fundamental mechanism. When we are operating in new mind mode, we apply explicit knowledge of both facts and rules. Most problems we need to deal with are not novel, or at least not entirely novel, although details and context might vary. Being able to infer rules which enable us to achieve our goals in a range of similar situations would confer great evolutionary advantage for our species. The fact that such inferences are not logically valid is really neither here nor there from a psychological and evolutionary view point. Epistemic rationality is not conferred by virtue of logic and truth, as is now widely recognised in psychology with a major shift towards a new paradigm psychology of reasoning based on belief and probability (Elqayam and Over 2013) . What is epistemically rational is what serves our goals in decision making. Deontic introduction provides a crucial linchpin between epistemic and instrumental rationality. If epistemic rationality is just about true beliefs, we lack the link to action, and without action, there is no instrumental rationality. Deontic introduction is best placed to provide this link between declarative and procedural knowledge. This is simplest to reconcile if both belief and action are related to action and goal attainment. Deontic introduction allows us to create tailor-made rules for novel situations, leading to action, and providing the basis for cognitive success and instrumental rationality.
So we propose that as language and explicit forms of cognition were evolving, an extremely valuable resource for the emerging new human mind would have been the creation of novel deontic rules. Such a generative capacity is only possible because language allows us to refer to situations removed in place and time, a distinctly newmind ability. Habit learning was still there in the old mind but the ability to learn and process explicit rules for achieving our goals would also be incredibly useful and often a much quicker and more reliable form of learning. Unlike habits, such rules could be passed from one person to another as culturally accumulated wisdom, corresponding to what we now call education. However, the ability for individuals to infer context-rich, relevant deontic rules from their own observation and experience would clearly be advantageous. If we see someone burn themselves on a hot stove, it is to our advantage to infer and use the rule 'if a stove is hot, do not touch it' rather than to acquire the knowledge by direct experience. What they have learned painfully with the old mind, we have learned painlessly with the new.
Deontic introduction also has social value in the new mind, creating rules to regulate social transactions in novel situations. After all, we create deontic rules of conduct not just for ourselves but for others as well. For example, conformity as triggered by the Asch paradigm (Asch 1946 ) is arguably based on deontic introduction, where 'is' ('everyone else says this line is longer') rapidly becomes 'ought' ('I ought to say the same thing'). Participants in the Asch paradigm were never explicitly instructed to agree with the majority, so what else could create this 'ought' rule? Norms, as Searle (2005) once put it, are the glue that holds society together. Without deontic introduction to generate new norms, we would still be stuck with deontic rules stating that flint spearheads must not be created in residential caves. We need deontic introduction to create new, tailor-made rules for a changing social environment, for example to regulate conduct on social media, or to programme responses to moral dilemmas in self-driving cars (Bonnefon et al. 2016) .
This section would not be complete without a direct comparison between our own evolutionary position and the evolutionary perspective advocated by Cosmides and Tooby (e.g., Cosmides 1989; Cosmides and Tooby 1994) , who should be credited with being the first to identify the evolutionary importance of deontic reasoning. We do not have the space to go into this debate in detail, but in a nutshell, Cosmides suggested that reasoning is only effective to the extent that it represents innate Darwinian algorithms, that is, specially-evolved, encapsulated rules, that reflect Fodor-style modules (Fodor 1983) . The paradigm case is social contracts ('If you take a benefit, you must pay a cost'), rules that regulate social exchange and prevent cheating. Impor-tantly, this is supported by an approach to cognitive architecture which has come to be dubbed 'massive modularity'. Unlike Fodor's modularity theory, in which modules are supplemented by a central, general-purpose processor, proponents of massive modularity see no role for the central processing at all, basing all cognitive processing purely on modular cognition.
It should be clear by now that our own position could not be more different. Deontic introduction is not restricted to a limited number of innate Darwinian algorithms; on the contrary, the evolutionary advantage it confers is precisely due to its extraordinary flexibility and adaptivity to any potential context and utility. In this, it is distinctly a new-mind capacity. However, the comparison raises an interesting issue: How much of deontic introduction is prewired and universal? Unlike Cosmides and Tooby, we are leery of any modular explanations based on innateness. The universality of language itself (and hence its innateness) has become one of the big debates in cognitive science (Evans and Levinson 2009) . To date, no cross-cultural studies of deontic introduction have been conducted (and not very many of deontic thinking generally; although see Beller et al. 2009 ). However, we believe that the evolutionary advantage that deontic introduction confers is too great for at least some of the underlying mechanisms not to be universal. How much and in which way is something for future work to examine empirically.
We must generate, acquire, store and use many such deontic rules in our lifetimes, many of them based on observation or experience, others on instruction and reading. It is entirely rational and appropriate that we induce deontic rules, showing-if we needed any more convincing-that a notion of epistemic rationality based on valid deductive inference is woefully inadequate. Of course, such deontic inferences are not guaranteed to be successful. We may generate inappropriate rules by faulty observation, incorrect or infelicitous inference or over-generalisation. When we are wrong, further observation or experience may allow us to make corrections. This uncertain rationality is the best we have.
